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The Original Understanding of Constitutional
Legitimacy
Ilan Wurman∗
This Article argues that three influential schools of originalism,
which we might label libertarian, progressive, and conservative, adhere
to particular understandings of constitutional legitimacy, which then
inform their particular constitutional hermeneutics. The Article
demonstrates that as originally understood by the Founders, however,
constitutional legitimacy depended on all three conceptions advocated
by these schools of thought—that is, the Constitution had to protect
natural rights, it had to enable self-government, and it had to be
ratified by popular sovereignty. Further, the Article gives considerable
treatment—remarkably for the first time in the law review literature—
to James Madison’s letter in response to Thomas Jefferson’s famous
“dead hand of the past” argument, in which we might find an
understudied ground for constitutional obedience: prudence.
The discussion on the Founders’ original understanding of
constitutional legitimacy provides two principal insights: First, it
provides us with a more holistic case for constitutional obedience than
modern originalist theories, whose narrower theories of legitimacy may
be unpersuasive standing alone. Second, it demonstrates that broader
hermeneutics are necessary as an originalist matter or simply because
we find the Founders’ understanding more persuasive. The Article will
also suggest, in the conclusion, that the more holistic account of
constitutional legitimacy might provide a new justification for
originalism.

∗ Stanford Law School, J.D. 2013. Mr. Wurman is an associate in the D.C. office of
Winston & Strawn LLP and served as a law clerk to the Honorable Jerry Smith of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit during the 2013–14 term. Thanks to William Baude,
Wesley J. Campbell, Nathan Chapman, John Harrison, Larry Kramer, Michael W. McConnell,
Josh Patashnik, James Phillips, and Zachary Price. Thanks especially to Richard Epstein for
providing me with an advance preview of his new book.
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INTRODUCTION
For the last few decades, many originalists have developed
theories of constitutional interpretation around particular notions of
constitutional legitimacy. This Article will show that three influential,
contemporary originalist constitutional theories—which we may
tentatively label libertarian, progressive, and conservative theories—
propose or assume a particular notion of constitutional legitimacy.
Each theory of legitimacy then seems to require, or at least to
inform, a particular method of constitutional interpretation. The
Article, however, will conclude that constitutional legitimacy, at least
as originally understood by the Founders, was rooted in grounds
broader than those offered by modern originalist theories. Broader
hermeneutics may therefore be necessary either as an originalist
matter or simply because we find the Founders’ understanding of
legitimacy more persuasive. The Article will also suggest generally
820
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that the Founders’ broader understanding of constitutional
legitimacy may prove more persuasive than the legitimacy theories of
modern scholars.
Each originalist theory develops a hermeneutic that stems from
its understanding of legitimacy. We may say, as an approximation,
that libertarian thinkers support what Randy Barnett has called a
“presumption of liberty,” stemming from their natural rights theory
of the Constitution. 1 Progressive originalists advocate what I shall
call the “progressive presumption,” which aims to enhance or enable
democratic decision making through a judicial activism of sorts. 2
Jack Balkin is the most recent and comprehensive advocate of this
view in his book Living Originalism, 3 which argues that the openended rights provisions of the Constitution were intended to enable
future democratic decision making through debates over
constitutional construction. Finally, more conservative thinkers
support a “presumption of constitutionality,” stemming from what
they see as their commitment to self-government and judicial
restraint. 4
The vast majority of the originalists surveyed in this Article fall
into the third camp. Although there are only a few libertarian and
progressive scholars in this field, these few have had a tremendous
impact not only on legal scholarship, but also on popular thinking
about originalism. They deserve as much attention, therefore, as
their more numerous conservative counterparts.
Describing these theories of interpretation in terms of these
presumptions will help our analysis. 5 Each theory focuses on some
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. Several scholars have tried to characterize the different schools of originalism in
other ways. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 18–34 (1999) (classifying the theories
in terms of their emphasis on democracy, rights, natural law, or pragmatism) [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith,
Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–62 (2009) (tracing the evolution of originalism
from original intention to original meaning, then to original public understanding, and now to
new theories of a “hypothetical, reasonable person” understanding); Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV.
J.L & PUB. POL’Y 29, 33 (2011) (noting that there are several kinds of originalism—
“[l]ibertarian-oriented natural rights theories, pragmatic law-and-economic theories, . . . and
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over-arching principle of constitutional legitimacy, which then seems
to require a particular understanding of the meaning of the
Constitution. These interpretations, however, fail to recognize that
the Framers intended, and the ratifying public likely understood, the
Constitution to achieve several ends at once and that it may
therefore be legitimate for broader reasons. 6
The libertarian-originalist scholars emphasize that obedience to
the Constitution is warranted only if we abandon the idea of consent
and replace it with the notion that the Constitution must protect our
natural rights. As Barnett argues, we must obey the Constitution
only if it is, on the whole, just by some conception of justice. 7 The
progressive constitutional theorists all depend on some notion of
current democratic legitimacy, successive acts of popular sovereignty,
or enhancing democracy to justify constitutional obedience. 8 The
presumption-of-constitutionality
originalists—that
is,
most
originalists—rely on the initial act of popular sovereignty as
demanding obedience to the Constitution. 9
Part I of this Article provides a new account of these theories
that allows us better to see how the theorists’ particular
understandings of constitutional legitimacy lead to particular
hermeneutics. Specifically, it will show that (1) each of the following
theories demands a certain kind of constitutional legitimacy for the
Constitution to have a claim to our obedience; (2) each demands an

Burkean doctrinal theories”). I am not classifying the theories along these lines, but rather on
the constitutional presumptions that tend to flow from them. The authors examined in this
Article, moreover, do not all use the term “original meaning” in exactly the same way. They all
frequently use it, however, to refer to how the ratifying public understood the text’s meaning
or to what the Framers intended. Because I believe there is substantial overlap between these
understandings of original meaning, I will use “original meaning” loosely to refer to both.
6. Others have criticized constitutional theorists for elevating some principles of the
constitutional text at the expense of others. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 23 (“Ely is not convincing in demonstrating that the
Constitution is uniquely concerned with procedural values to the exclusion of various
substantive commitments.”); id. at 29 (“In both theory and practice, the rights approach has
been highly selective in its choice of values to elevate to a fundamental position worthy of
judicial protection.”). I will try to show this more systematically through an examination of
how the Framers understood constitutional legitimacy itself.
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.C. It is worth repeating that this categorization is a generalization.
As I will emphasize later, the presumption of constitutionality encompasses a large number of
originalists who certainly disagree on important points of constitutional theory.
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“original meaning” interpretation independent of the question of
constitutional legitimacy; and yet (3) each seems to require a
different interpretive method as a result of its particular
understanding of constitutional legitimacy. The ultimate claim is that
each of these theories of legitimacy is incomplete, and thus each
particular hermeneutic is also incomplete.
Part II gives a short account of how the Founders, and
particularly James Madison, understood constitutional legitimacy
and the idea of founding. It will show that the Founders understood
that the Constitution needed to be legitimate in each of the three
conceptions advocated by these different schools—that it must be
based on consent of the governed (or popular sovereignty), that it
must enable a representative (or republican) form of government,
and that it must secure the just ends of government. This Part will
then examine Madison’s response to Jefferson’s letter in which the
latter famously raised the “dead hand of the past” argument, the
claim that the Constitution cannot bind succeeding generations.
While Jefferson’s letter is well known and often quoted (especially by
progressives), Madison’s direct response to Jefferson in his own
letter, as far as I can tell, has never received any considerable
treatment in the literature. I believe Madison’s argument provides us
with an additional reason for constitutional obedience: although the
Constitution may be imperfectly legitimate, prudence may
nevertheless justify adherence to the whole.
The principal insights of Part II are these: First, the question of
why the Constitution ought to be binding is important to all
constitutional theories and to all American citizens who must choose
whether or not to obey the Constitution today. While the political
and philosophical views of the Founding generation cannot bootstrap themselves into acceptance, surely there is great wisdom to be
found in the generation that had to justify breaking away from its
previous allegiance and justify an entirely new mode of government.
Whether we are ultimately persuaded by them or not, the Founders
provide us with a more holistic account of why the Constitution is
legitimate than many other theories do. It is my view that the three
grounds of legitimacy, along with prudence as a fourth ground,
justify constitutional obedience.
Second, if the Constitution can only be legitimate, at least in the
Founders’ view, if it satisfies all three conceptions of legitimacy, then
hermeneutics broader than those proposed by many current scholars
823
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are necessary as an originalist matter. Determining the proper
interpretive method may be a difficult enterprise because of the
compromises the Framers made among the competing ends of
government, but I will briefly suggest that an original interpretive
conventions approach may be a promising way to discern original
meaning.
There is another possible insight from this discussion that will
require further study. The Article will note in conclusion that the
question of why the Constitution should be obeyed and whether
originalism is the proper hermeneutic approach are conceptually
distinct questions; one could conclude that the Constitution is
worthy of obedience but that it requires a non-originalist
interpretation. This Article aims to begin the argument that
constitutional obedience, rooted in the Founders’ grounds for
constitutional legitimacy, may provide a new rationale for originalist
interpretation. This would extend beyond the rationales rooted in
the “writtenness” of the text—rationales to which the libertarian,
progressive, and conservative originalists all adhere.
I. A TALE OF THREE THEORIES
This Part aims to show that (1) each of the following theories
demands a certain kind of constitutional legitimacy for the
Constitution to have a claim to our obedience; (2) each demands an
“original meaning” interpretation, independent from the question of
constitutional legitimacy; and yet (3) each requires a different
interpretive method as a result of its particular legitimacy theory,
even though each claims that its hermeneutic derives solely from the
text of the Constitution itself. The next Part will then show how, at
least as originally understood by the Founders, the Constitution’s
legitimacy was rooted in grounds broader than those offered by
these originalist theories, and thus interpreting the Constitution as
an originalist may require broader hermeneutics.
A. Libertarian Originalism
1. Natural rights
The “presumption of liberty” theory comes most famously from
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Randy Barnett. 10 In his work Restoring the Lost Constitution: The
Presumption of Liberty, he argues that popular sovereignty is an
inadequate basis for constitutional obedience: only a constitution
that “contains adequate procedures” to protect natural rights can lay
a claim to legitimacy and our obedience. 11 He challenges the validity
of several consent-based arguments, such as that we consent to the
Constitution when we choose to vote, to reside in the country, not
to revolt, and not to amend the Constitution. 12 In short, that the
Constitution was ratified by popular assemblies in the late 1780s
makes no difference; indeed, it appears that even if the Constitution
were formally abolished today and re-ratified with exactly the same
text, then, assuming the Constitution was not just by Barnett’s
conception, it would not provide any better reason for nonconsenting parties to adhere to its commands.
While Barnett’s entire work is an attempt to persuade us that the
Constitution would be legitimate—and demand our obedience—if it
protected our natural rights, he explicitly acknowledges that the
Constitution could also be legitimate based on some other
conception of justice. What is certain is that it must be just by some
conception. 13 Barnett attempts to get around this somewhat
unsatisfying proposition—after all, what if someone doesn’t agree
with his conception?—by claiming that his theory does not depend
on what conception of justice one holds; rather, “constitutional
legitimacy can be seen as a product of procedural assurances that
legal commands are not unjust.” 14 He then argues, however, that it
is only legitimate to bind non-consenting residents if their natural
rights are protected. 15 Thus, it is still unclear why the Constitution
ought to be binding on those who do not share his natural-rights
view of justice.
10. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY (2004).

11. Id. at 4; see also id. at 11–52.
12. Id. at 14–25.
13. Id. at 3 (“Although my thesis concerning legitimacy does depend on the claim that
‘justice’ is independent of whatever may happen to be commanded by positive law, it does not
depend on acceptance of any particular conception of justice.”).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4 (“I contend that if a constitution contains adequate procedures to protect
these natural rights, it can be legitimate even if it was not consented to by everyone; and one
that lacks adequate procedures to protect natural rights is illegitimate even if it was consented
to by a majority.”).
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Richard Epstein takes essentially the same view of constitutional
legitimacy as Barnett. 16 He begins with abandoning consent (or
popular sovereignty) as the justification for obedience to the state.
He writes that Locke was acutely aware of the problem of achieving
unanimous consent for the formation of civil society out of the state
of nature, and thus Locke adopted a view of tacit consent: anyone
who does not leave, and who enjoys the protection of the state,
tacitly consents to be ruled by the state. 17 This was an error, writes
Epstein, because tacit consent “becomes the thin edge of the wedge
that grants legislators the lion’s share of the surplus that Lockean
institutions wish to keep out of their hands.” 18
Thus, Epstein argues, to make the Lockean, natural-rights
conception of the state viable, we must abandon tacit consent and
any possibility of consent as a source of contractual (or
constitutional) obligation. That obligation must come instead from a
theory of exchange between the sovereign and the individual:
The bulwark of the individual is . . . that whenever any portion of
[his property] is taken from him, he must receive from the state . . .
some equivalent or greater benefit as part of the same transaction.
The categorical command that property shall not be taken without
tacit consent [the Lockean theory] must therefore be rewritten to
provide that property may be taken upon provision of just
compensation. 19

Epstein then argues that this Lockean conception of natural
rights and the end of the state “was dominant at the time when the
Constitution was adopted,” 20 and the substantive and procedural
protections of the Constitution aimed at the protection of private
property. 21 Both Epstein and Barnett, therefore, abandon any notion
of consent of the governed as legitimating constitutional obedience;
both require that the Constitution protect natural rights (and
especially property rights) in order for it to be legitimate and
demand our adherence.

16. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 14–15.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 17.
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2. Writtenness
Originalism neither self-evidently nor necessarily follows our
acceptance of the constitution’s legitimacy. For Barnett, we must
adhere to the original meaning because a written text requires such a
reading. 22 The “writtenness” of the text and its substance are two
different things; again, if the substance of the constitutional text did
not enable legitimate lawmaking, then the Constitution is not
binding. 23 Analogizing to contract law, Barnett argues that writing
serves evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarification functions,
and that creating a written constitution is valuable for precisely these
reasons. 24 The use of the parol evidence rule in contracts also
suggests that interpreting written instruments requires adherence to
original meaning; otherwise, parties could contradict the explicit
provisions of the contract with additional evidence outside of the
written contract. That would undermine the four functional
purposes served by the writing and would require the difficult
enterprise of reading the minds of the parties. 25 The same holds true
of constitutions. 26
Epstein’s book is not a justification for originalism, and he
dispenses with matters of interpretation rather quickly. “[T]he idea
that constitutions must evolve to meet changing circumstances,” he
writes, “is an invitation to destroy the rule of law. If the next
generation can do what it wants, why bother with a constitution to
begin with, when it is only an invitation for perpetual revision?” 27
Whether the eminent domain clause—the primary focus of his book
Takings—was meant to protect markets, autonomy, or both, does
not matter; instead, “greater progress will be made by assuming that
the clause is designed to do what it says, to ensure that private
property is not taken for public use without just compensation.” 28
Epstein does not care for the intent of the Framers with respect to
22. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 100–09.
23. Id. at 109.
24. Id. at 101–02.
25. Id. at 102–03.
26. Or at least he argues that the same holds true. It is not entirely clear that
constitutions—the fundamental social contract— are the same as normal contracts, or should
be treated like normal contracts. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 522 (2003).
27. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 24.
28. Id. at 26.
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specific constitutional provisions, but he is an originalist insofar as he
is a textualist who does not accept “perpetual revision” of the
Constitution’s text. 29 Thus, both Epstein and Barnett adhere to
original meaning based on the writtenness of the text or simply
because a constitution would not be a constitution if the text were
changeable.
3. The presumption of liberty
It is from the text itself and its original meaning that both
Epstein and Barnett claim to derive their understanding of the
Constitution’s substance. Barnett argues that if the text of the
various constitutional provisions is properly understood, it points to
interpretations that may be described as a presumption of liberty. 30
More specifically, he argues that when properly understood, the
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Ninth
Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment all enshrine this presumption. 31 The gist of
this hermeneutic is that it “would place the burden on the
government to show why its interference with liberty is both
necessary and proper rather than . . . imposing a burden on the
citizen to show why the exercise of a particular liberty is a
‘fundamental right.’” 32 The textual source for this hermeneutic is the
Ninth Amendment’s protection for all liberty interests, not merely
fundamental ones, and the constitutional command that all laws
passed by Congress shall be both necessary and proper. 33 Barnett

29. Larry Alexander also describes this as originalist. See Larry Alexander, Takings of
Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 225 (1986).
30. The clearest statement that indicates that Barnett derives this presumption from the
original meaning appears on page 154, where he writes that “[t]he original meaning of these
nearly lost clauses [Necessary & Proper, Privileges or Immunities, and the Ninth Amendment]
argues strongly against a presumption of constitutionality and in favor of the contrary
construction I describe in chapter 10: the Presumption of Liberty.” BARNETT, supra note 10,
at 154.
31. Id. at 5; see also id. at 153–55 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at 191–93
(Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 225–26 (Ninth Amendment); id. at 278–321
(Commerce Clause); id. at 259–60 (“Instead of authorizing a search for particular rights, the
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause can be viewed as establishing a
general Presumption of Liberty, which places the burden on the government to establish the
necessity and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom.”).
32. Id. at 262.
33. Id.
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does not, at least consciously, impose the presumption of liberty on
the text in order to make the Constitution more just; these
constitutional clauses, when given this correct original meaning, are
also just, and so the Constitution is also legitimate and worthy of our
obedience.
Epstein’s whole work on takings, our main source for his views
on constitutional interpretation, is meant to encourage the judiciary
to strike down far more government legislation than it currently
does 34 by treating almost any government action that harms property
values as a taking. 35 To be sure, Epstein does not care for
presumptions. Rather, he writes that the principles he espouses
emerge from the constitutional text itself. 36 One could certainly
argue, however, that Epstein’s approach effectively amounts to a
presumption of liberty when it comes to economic regulation, or at
least a presumption of liberty with a presumption of compensation if
our property rights (and the liberty we are allowed to exercise as a
result of those property rights) are taken away. 37 Indeed, Epstein has
recently completed a larger work, The Classical Liberal Constitution,
in which he admits that the constitutional text is in fact vague and
we must therefore interpret it with particular background
principles. 38 He claims that classical liberalism (which is essentially
consistent with modern libertarianism) is indeed the proper choice

34. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 30–31 (“In what follows I shall advocate a level of
judicial intervention far greater than we now have, and indeed far greater than we ever have
had.”).
35. He argues, for example, that Supreme Court decisions refusing to grant
compensation to riparians, who are denied access by government action to flowing waters on
their lands, were wrongly decided, id. at 70–72; that government restrictions on the power to
sell private property, condemnation of leasehold interests without the right of renewal, and
interference with goodwill all require compensation, id. at 74–86; that any interference with
contracts requires compensation, id. at 90–92; and that all taxes and regulation affecting the
possession, use, and disposition of private property are takings, id. at 100–01.
36. Id. at 30; cf. id. at 31 (“[A]t no point does the argument depend upon a belief in
judicial activism in cases of economic liberties. Instead I believe that the courses indicated are
necessary implications derived from the constitutional text and the underlying theory of the
state that it embodies.”).
37. Larry Alexander summarizes Epstein’s interpretive theory thus: “In brief, Epstein
argues that the takings clause of the Constitution, properly interpreted, proscribes the
destruction (= takings) of any right in the bundle of property rights enforceable at common
law against private individuals or groups (= property), except insofar as public goods are
realizable and overall wealth can be increased (= public use), and then only if all share pro rata
in the increase in wealth (= just compensation).” Alexander, supra note 29, at 224.
38. RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 52–53 (2014).
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for interpretation because it was the most significant moral theory at
work during the Founding era. He concludes: “In its enduring
provisions, our Constitution is most emphatically a classical liberal
document. Its successful interpretation on all points dealing with text
and its surrounding norms should be read in sync with the tradition of
strong property rights, voluntary association, and limited
government.” 39 His Lockean theory of legitimacy requires a particular
hermeneutic when interpreting the text of the Constitution.
To summarize: (1) both Barnett’s and Epstein’s theories depend
not on consent of the governed to legitimate constitutional
obedience, but on the concept of natural rights; (2) they both rely
on original meaning; and (3) their textual analyses require
hermeneutics that are significantly more libertarian, and such
hermeneutics derive at least in part from their theories of legitimacy.
B. Progressive Originalism
We now come to the second grouping of constitutional theories.
The label “progressive presumption” or the more specific label
“presumption of democratic legitimacy” has not been applied to
these theories before, and perhaps for good reason. While the great
progressive theorists of the last three decades have all tried to justify
their constitutional theories by appealing to some notion of
democratic legitimacy, one could argue that the progressive versions
of democratic legitimacy invariably justify unpopular Supreme Court
decisions.
If nothing else, however, characterizing these theories under this
presumption conveys how these theorists purport to make the
Constitution more democratically legitimate by “enabling” or
“enhancing” democracy. That also allows us to see how their
particular view of legitimacy seems to require a particular

39. Id. at 53–54. Michael Rappaport describes Epstein’s theory as follows: “He believes
that the constitutional language should be given its original meaning, but that the language is
often incomplete or vague. Therefore, he argues that the language must be interpreted in
accordance with some background principles, and those are classical liberal principles, because
the leading political theory at the time of the Constitution was classical liberalism. As a result,
[Epstein] is able to argue that the Constitution’s originalism meaning leads largely to classical
liberalism.” Michael Rappaport, Richard Epstein on “Constitutionalism, Originalism, and
Libertarianism,” ORIGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://originalismblog.typepad.com
/the-originalism-blog/2013/02/richard-epstein-on-constitutionalism-originalism-andlibertarianismmike-rappaport.html.
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hermeneutic. This Part will address one prominent progressive,
originalist scholar, as well as one non-originalist, progressive thinker
who has originalist tendencies.
Jack Balkin, the most recent “progressive presumption” theorist,
lays out his theory in his book, Living Originalism. 40 He argues that
if one properly understands the Framers’ intent and also the
language and structure of the Constitution, then an originalist
understanding of the Constitution leads to living constitutionalism. 41
To Balkin, a living constitutionalist is the true originalist. Balkin’s
fundamental argument is that the Constitution is written in three
separate kinds of clauses—rules, standards, and principles. While the
constitutional rules are fixed (such as the requirement that the
President be at least thirty-five years of age), the Framers left the
text’s standards and especially its principles to be fleshed out by
future generations. 42 Balkin argues that, as a consequence, the
Framers intended the Constitution to enable politics—that is, to
enable future generations to put their own glosses on the
Constitution—rather than to constrain them to avoid, as Justice
Scalia and others have said, 43 the possible rotting of American society
and politics.
Balkin thus starts on the same ground as the libertarianoriginalists, arguing that we must obey the Constitution as originally
understood. He also argues for this proposition on the ground of the
text’s writtenness. 44 His explanation is less complicated than
Barnett’s, and even seems rather intuitive. He writes that to maintain
the framework of the Constitution over time “we must preserve the

40. BALKIN, supra note 3.
41. Though the argument that the Framers may not have intended for their “intent” to
guide the future has been made several times. See, e.g., Paul A. Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). Contra John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 788–93 (2009).
42. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 6–7; see id. at 24 (“[The] basic job [of constitutions] is not
to prevent future decision-making but to enable it.”).
43. See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
44. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 35–49; id. at 35 (“Constitutional interpretation in the
United States requires that we look to original meaning because the American Constitution is
a written legal text that constitutes a framework for governance.”).
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meaning of the words that constitute the framework.” 45 Or, “[t]o
stick to the plan and implement it, we must respect its particular
choices about freedom and constraint for political actors . . . .” 46
Furthermore, “[i]f we do not attempt to preserve legal meaning over
time, then we will not be following the written Constitution as our
plan but instead will be following a different plan.” 47 Whether or not
this is a rigorous justification for an originalist interpretation, it is
clear that Balkin presumes it as a starting ground. He claims to
separate the question of how we should interpret the Constitution
from whether we should actually obey it and keep it as our plan for
government. 48
Balkin makes the case for fidelity to the Constitution by avoiding
the problem of consent-as-legitimacy in a new way. He argues that
each generation gives its ongoing consent by debating constitutional
construction. He writes that over time “Americans try to persuade
each other about the best meaning of constitutional text and
principle in current circumstances. These debates and political
struggles also help generate Americans’ investment in the
Constitution as their Constitution, even if they never officially
consented to it . . . .” 49 He further argues, “[i]n every generation,
We the People of the United States make the Constitution our own
by calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what
they mean in our own time.” 50 Thus, consent to the Constitution is
an ongoing process that takes the shape of changing constitutional
understandings. These constitutional constructions themselves are
legitimate, Balkin claims, because of their responsiveness to
democratic politics over time: “[T]he initial authority of the text
comes from the fact that it was created through successive acts of
popular
sovereignty . . . . The
authority
of
constitutional
constructions, in turn, comes from their direct or long-run

45. Id. at 36.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 38 (“It is important to note that my argument for following original
meaning assumes that Americans want to be faithful to the written Constitution as law and
that we want to continue to accept it as our framework for governance. . . . Interpreting the
text of the Constitution does not automatically require that we accept the written Constitution
as a plan of governance.”).
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 11.
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responsiveness to popular will as expressed through the processes of
democratic politics.” 51 In short, the Constitution is premised on
democracy and thus any constitutional theory must aim at
democratic legitimacy. Balkin argues that his theory provides just
such legitimacy because it is the very act of debating constitutional
construction that makes the Constitution today “our law.” 52
We see, therefore, that, like his libertarian-originalist
counterparts, Balkin relies on the original meaning of the
Constitution, and he begins with a particular understanding of what
the Constitution must allow for it to be legitimate: it must allow
successive generations to put their own glosses on the constitutional
text for it to be democratically legitimate and “our law.” Balkin
further claims that his particular interpretation of the Constitution’s
clauses flows from the original meaning of the text. Thus, he argues
that the Framers intended for us continually to change how we
interpret the standards and principles in the text. 53 Of course, such a
view runs directly contrary to Barnett’s libertarian-originalist thesis
that the Constitution was meant primarily to protect individuals
from future decision-making by enshrining their rights—and thus a
presumption of liberty—into the constitutional text. Balkin draws
the precise opposite conclusion than does Barnett from the openendedness of the Constitution’s grand rights provisions with respect
to the correct constitutional hermeneutic. 54
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 69–73; see also id. at 64–73; id. at 71 (“The democratic legitimacy of the
Constitution depends on the people’s belief that their Constitution and their government
belongs to them, so that if they speak and protest and make their views known over time, the
constitutional construction of courts and the political branches will eventually respond to their
political values and to the issues they care about most.”). Balkin elaborates on this kind of
legitimacy toward the end of his book. He insists that watershed cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education or the sexual equality cases of the 1970s followed on the heels of democratic and
social movements, and thus his version of “democratic constitutionalism” is in fact
democratically legitimate. See id. at 320–25.
53. Cf. id. at 25 (“This choice of [vague and abstract] language [of principles] makes
little sense if the purpose of constitutionalism is to strongly constrain future decisionmaking.”);
id. at 29 (“Open-ended rights guarantees . . . . are designed to channel and discipline future
political judgment, not forestall it.” (emphasis in original)). See generally id. at 21–34.
54. Though Balkin claims that living constitutionalism follows from originalism, he
really seems to rely on the two ideas separately. Thus he claims that living constitutionalism is
appropriate because the courts are responsive to democratic politics in the long run. This is
what makes the Constitution legitimate. He explains that Brown v. Board of Education was in
fact responsive to existing democratic and social movements, as were the sexual equality cases
in the 1970s; even Heller was responsive to the guns rights movements of the last two decades.
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To summarize: Balkin’s constitutional theory (1) requires a
constitution that allows for updating the text so that it can be “our
law” and thus democratically legitimate; (2) begins with the original
meaning of the text based on the Constitution’s writtenness; and (3)
arrives at a hermeneutic of living originalism that is consistent with
his view of the requirements for constitutional legitimacy.
Insofar as Balkin tries to develop a theory that will be
democratically legitimate, he follows in the footsteps of at least one
great progressive constitutional theorist, John Hart Ely. 55 Ely does not
pretend to be originalist, but he did claim to rely on the original
meaning of the Constitution when it suited his argument. His
hermeneutic seems to depend on his particular ground for legitimacy.
Ely wrote his famous Democracy and Distrust in 1980, in which
he rejects the possibility of discovering fundamental values to
supplement the open-ended texture of the Constitution’s clauses. 56
Nevertheless, the text is still open-ended; something has to
supplement it. Ely argues that the Court could interpret these
provisions to provide better process for democratic decision making;
this would include “clearing the channels of political change on the
one hand, and . . . correcting certain kinds of discrimination against
minorities on the other,” as the Warren Court had done. 57 Such a
“representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its
rival value-protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the
contrary (and quite by design) entirely supportive of, the underlying
premises of the American system of representative democracy.” 58
The crucial problem is that while Ely recognizes both that the
constitutional text needs supplementation and that it would be
impossible to discover substantive values to provide that
supplementation, he somehow believes that his process-oriented view
is itself not a value judgment. In other words, he is not really so
different from those scholars he disavows for seeking to vindicate

But he does not once mention Roe v. Wade as being legitimated by a long-run responsiveness
to democratic politics. Roe is justified strictly by his original meaning approach. It thus appears
that he is willing to use one or the other approach—originalism or his conception of living
constitutionalism—to justify the doctrinal results.
55. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
56. Id. at 43–72.
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id. at 88.
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substantive values. By choosing to emphasize representation and
process, he ignores the very real possibility that the Constitution did
mean to protect some kind of substantive rights as well. Ely is far too
careful to have missed this criticism, and he addresses it several times
in his book. He admits that “our Constitution is too complex a
document to lie still for any pat characterization.” 59 Yet Ely’s
problem is that he does characterize the Constitution as
overwhelmingly focused on process and representation, arguing not
only from the structure of the text but also from selective writings of
the Founders. 60
An example may better illustrate. Ely acknowledges that our
Constitution “has always been substantially concerned with
preserving liberty,” but he argues the relevant question is “how that
concern has been pursued.” 61 Yet immediately preceding this claim,
he suggests that the few genuinely substantive provisions in the
Constitution have been unsuccessful. He correctly argues that the
substantive value of slavery and prohibition did not survive because
of subsequent repeal; but he also argues that two other substantive
values—the right to bear arms and the freedom to contract, which
“at least arguably were placed beyond the reach of the political
process”—were in fact “‘repealed’ by judicial construction.” 62 He
concludes: “Maybe in fact our forebears did not intend very seriously
to protect those values, but the fact that the Court, in the face of
what must be counted at least plausible contrary arguments, so
readily read these values out of the Constitution is itself instructive of
American expectation of a constitution.” 63
But Ely’s claims are susceptible to the same criticism as the other
theories examined thus far. His theory accounts for the decisions
limiting these substantive rights, but that hardly means the original
understanding of the Constitution was that these rights should be

59. See, e.g., id. at 101 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 92 (“[M]y claim is only that
the original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, dedicated to
concerns of process and structure and not to the identification and preservation of specific
substantive values. Any claim that it was exclusively so conceived would be ridiculous . . . . And
indeed there are other provisions in the original document that seem almost entirely valueoriented, though my point, of course, is that they are few and far between.”).
60. See id. at 88–93.
61. Id. at 100.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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read out by the Court. Ely begins with a pre-commitment to
representation as a source of constitutional legitimacy. True, Ely is
not known for pretending that his proposal for constitutional
interpretation derives from the original meaning of the text. 64 Yet
even he relies on original meaning when it suits his argument 65—and
this meaning seems to depend on his pre-commitment. He writes,
for example, that “[t]he original Constitution’s more pervasive
strategy . . . can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism”; that “the
concept of representation . . . had been at the core of our
Constitution from the beginning”; that the colonists were mainly
concerned with representative fairness; and that “the original
Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly,
dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the
identification and preservation of specific substantive values.” 66 To
be sure, he hedges: the Constitution was not exclusively concerned
with process, he writes. 67 Yet even he admits that “[o]n [his] more
expansive days,” he is tempted to claim that his view “represents the
ultimate interpretivism” (basically originalism). 68 Ultimately, he
seems to settle on the proposition that it really doesn’t matter
whether his approach is interpretivist or not. 69
In sum, Ely arrives at a particular constitutional hermeneutic that
hinges on his view of constitutional legitimacy and which, he claims,
is largely consistent with the original understanding of the
constitutional text.
C. Conservative Originalism
The last group of constitutional thinkers consists of originalists
whom we may also deem judicial minimalists. The first originalists
were mainly of this stripe, as originalism had its beginnings as a
revolt against the perceived judicial overreach of the Warren Court. 70

64. The first part of his book, after all, is a refutation that “interpretivism”—which in
the language of the day was essentially (though not entirely) equivalent to originalism—is
possible. See id. at 11–14, 41.
65. For his analysis on the original meaning and purpose of the Constitution, see id. at
80–82, 87–88 & footnote, 88–101.
66. Id. at 80, 82, 89, 92.
67. Id. at 92.
68. Id. at 87–88.
69. Id. at footnote on 88.
70. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principles, or Are
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It is important to stress that the “presumption of constitutionality” is
not usually a label applied to originalist thinkers because there is such
a wide variety of originalists. Much of the scholarship providing
descriptive accounts of originalism focuses on the evolution of
originalism from “original intentions” originalism to “original public
meaning,” to “original understanding,” and now to a “hypothetical
reasonable person” originalism. 71 Nevertheless, this presumption
again helps to clarify the pre-commitments of these originalist
thinkers.
1. Popular Sovereignty
Originalists who adhere to judicial minimalism and this
presumption argue that we owe obedience to the Constitution and
adherence to its constraints because the people themselves imposed
these constraints. As Michael McConnell has written, “The people’s
representatives have a right to govern, so long as they do not
transgress limits on their authority that are fairly traceable to the
constitutional precommitments of the people themselves, as reflected
directly through text and history, or indirectly through longstanding
practice and precedent.” 72 Justice Scalia’s adherence to the original
public understanding of the constitutional text evinces a similar
commitment to popular sovereignty: it is because the people
themselves have imposed certain constraints on the future that those
constraints are binding. 73 These are views of popular sovereignty that
the previous two schools of thought have rejected.
Keith Whittington gives a comprehensive account of popular
sovereignty as a ground for constitutional legitimacy, 74 summarizing
his view as follows: “By construing the Constitution in terms of the
intent of its creators, originalism both enforces the authoritative

They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 5, 21 (2011)
(“[O]riginalism not only promised a more or less principled ground for opposing further
liberal innovations, but also provided a potential justification for demands to roll back legal
doctrines that had originated either in the Warren Court or ‘the New Deal settlement’ that
marked the end of the Lochner era.”).
71. See supra note 5 for recent literature describing the evolution of originalism.
72. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment
on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1291
(1996–1997).
73. See Scalia, supra note 43, at 38.
74. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 110–59.
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decision of the people acting as sovereign and, equally important,
preserves the possibility of similar higher-order decision making by
the present and future generations of citizenry.” 75 Whittington, like
Barnett and Epstein, rejects the notion of tacit consent, 76 but he
claims that “We the People” give real consent each time we amend
the Constitution, just as the founding generation gave its real
consent when it ratified the Constitution. Whittington writes:
Consensual government does not require the imagination of a
current consent; rather, it requires that government receive
authorization for its actions. The Constitution provides that
authorization. Government action requiring different authorization
would require another such expression of consent. The
government was set in motion by consent, but it need not
demonstrate our continuing consent in order to remain in motion.
It is enough that it not change course, or even stop its motion,
except by our new consent. The implication is that the founders
initiated the Constitution, which remains valid and binding not by
virtue of their right to govern over us but by virtue of the
“historical accident” that their text is the most recent expression of
consent. 77

Thus, Whittington adopts the view of “democratic dualism,”
which maintains that the “people emerge at particular historical
moments to deliberate on constitutional issues and to provide
binding expressions of their will, which are to serve as fundamental
law in the future when the sovereign is absent.” 78 Dualism is the
same approach Bruce Ackerman takes to justify adherence to the
constitutional text, but Ackerman argues that the New Deal era was
a period of higher lawmaking. He interprets the constitutional
constructions of that era as the binding will of the people. 79

75. Id. at 111.
76. Id. at 129.
77. Id. at 133 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 135.
79. This concept is developed in several of Ackerman’s writings, but for a rather
comprehensive article, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99
YALE L.J. 453 (1989).
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2. Intentionalism versus writtenness
For Whittington, as with Balkin and Barnett, popular sovereignty
does not necessarily dictate originalism. Whittington also argues that
it is the writtenness of the Constitution that requires an adherence to
originalism. 80 But, he argues, just because the text is written does
not mean it has a claim to our obedience; popular sovereignty
justifies that obedience.
Not all originalists believe that originalism follows from the
writtenness of the constitutional text. 81 Initially, originalism
arguments were often based on intentionalism. Intentionalism holds
that the authority of a law always derives from the authority of the
lawgiver, and thus the lawgiver’s intent is authoritative. 82 Richard
Kay has explained: “Legal obligations arise because we recognize
law-making authority vested in certain human beings. It is to that
exercise of human will in making the relevant law that we refer in
statutory construction.” 83
Intentionalism offers a solution to the question of legitimacy—
we must obey because the intent of the Framers is authoritative. It
also, however, solves the question of interpretation—it is the intent
of the original lawgivers that matters, and thus we should be
originalists. Unlike with the libertarian and progressive theories of
legitimacy, which do not require originalism, a good argument can

80. He makes his case on three grounds: first, the break from Great Britain (which does
not have a written constitution) and the decision to fix our rights and principles in a written
text reveal that those rights and principles are permanent; second, that a written text needs to
be stable in order to allow judicial enforcement; and third, written legal texts all carry the
intent of their authors. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at
50.
81. I have hardly exhausted all theories of originalism based on language or writtenness.
For some additional examples, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (2008) (unpublished manuscript
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
82. See the discussion on this normative ground for originalism in Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1100–02 (1989).
83. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 232 (1988). Even John Hart Ely
seemed to recognize that constitutional law in at least some sense requires us to know
something about the original intentions of the Framers. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 55, at 16
(“Unless we know whether ‘natural born’ meant born to American parents on the one hand or
born to married parents on the other, we don’t know what the Ratifiers thought they were
ratifying and thus what we should recognize as the constitutional command.”).
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be made that originalism is required by intentionalism. While Kay
argues that discovering the intent of the Ratifiers (or Framers) is no
more difficult than any other historical investigation to which
thousands of students of history commit themselves every year, 84 this
version of originalism has suffered the most serious of attacks. 85
However, this attribute of intentionalism—that it simultaneously
solves the questions of legitimacy and interpretation—survives in
some popular sovereignty theories. Even though Whittington relies
on the text’s writtenness to justify originalism, many originalists
seem to believe that originalism is justified on the basis of popular
sovereignty alone. 86 The argument in the context of popular
sovereignty is almost identical to the argument in the intentionalism
context: If we obey the text because it is the will of the people
themselves, then surely we should adhere to their will—that is, their
original intentions. The only difference between this version of
popular sovereignty and Richard Kay’s intentionalism is the identity
of the lawgiver: for Kay it was the Framers, while for most
originalists today it is the Ratifiers.

84. Kay, supra note 83, at 252 (“The very breadth of [the] claim [of the impossibility of
historical understanding] makes it implausible. It is essentially an attack on the possibility and
validity of historical investigation. While some students of history deny the possibility of
objectively correct historical conclusions, the contrary view is also widely and firmly held.
Indeed, the force of the latter position is strengthened by the fact that history is a wellestablished discipline to which thousands of sensible people have devoted and continue to
devote their energy and intelligence.”).
85. For general criticisms, see Farber, supra note 82, at 1102. The most widely cited
critique of originalism on this ground—a critique thought to be fatal to the original intent
originalists—was Paul Brest’s famous article. Brest, supra note 41. He argues that it is
impossible to know the intent of the Framers or Ratifiers because it is too difficult to
determine each person’s individual “intention-vote,” which can vary at different levels of
generality. Id. at 209–17.
86. For a discussion of the general popular sovereignty rationales for originalism, see
Farber, supra note 82, at 1097–1100. He summarizes: “The majoritarian argument for
originalism has three premises: that our society’s ‘master norm’ is democracy; that the
Constitution gets its legitimacy solely from the majority will as expressed at the time of
enactment; and that judicial decisions are less ‘democratic’ than those of the elected branches
of government.” Id. at 1098. More generally, some kind of popular sovereignty argument
seems to be the most common justification for originalist interpretation. See Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440
(2007); Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
29, 39 (2011). For an argument that popular sovereignty cannot be the justification for
originalism, but that originalism is justified nonetheless, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y, 485 (2008).
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Of course, because this version of originalism requires a
commitment to the popular sovereignty justification for
constitutional legitimacy, the very necessity of originalism may thus
be called into question if we dispute the popular sovereignty basis of
the Constitution’s legitimacy. 87
Thus far, this subpart has shown the following: (1) These
originalists believe that the Constitution is legitimate because it is
based on the consent of the governed in past moments of
constitutional decision making—a notion that their libertarian and
progressive counterparts reject; and (2) They believe that originalism
follows from the very nature of the written text or from
intentionalism (whether we seek the intentions of the Framers or of
the Ratifiers).
3. Judicial minimalism and the presumption of constitutionality
It remains to be shown that these originalists require a
hermeneutic of judicial minimalism or a presumption of
constitutionality. It is important, upfront, not to overstate the case:
Originalism and judicial minimalism do not overlap perfectly. There
might be good reasons to be a minimalist without being an
originalist, and many originalists are not minimalists. Still, there is a
class of judicial minimalists whose hermeneutic—the presumption of
constitutionality—seems to derive from their commitment to the
popular sovereignty justification for constitutional legitimacy.
The presumption of constitutionality itself came most definitively
from Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, in which he wrote that courts ought to, “in the exercise of
their discretion, refuse an injunction unless the alleged invalidity” of

87. This challenge is all too common in the progressive literature, which argues that we
have no duty to obey the decisions of past majorities, and often that the Constitution is not
legitimate because different groups—such as minorities and women—were excluded from the
ratifying process. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 41, at 225 (“Even if the adopters freely consented
to the Constitution, however, this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the
founding document, for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt
the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.”). See also id. at 230 (“The drafting,
adopting, or amending of the Constitution may itself have suffered from defects of democratic
process which detract from its moral claims. To take an obvious example, the interests of black
Americans were not adequately represented in the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 or the
fourteenth amendment.”). Note, however, that this is precisely Barnett’s position, too. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text. I will explore how some of the Founders might have
responded to these objections in Part II.
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a legislative act is clear. 88 Brandeis cited several famous Justices,
including Chief Justice John Marshall, for the proposition. 89 Harvard
Law professor James Thayer had written forty years earlier, in 1893,
that the Supreme Court “can only disregard [an] Act when those
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake,
but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to
rational question.” 90 This doctrine quickly became the tool of
judicial progressives who wished to adopt the dissent’s position in
Lochner v. New York and give deference to legislative judgments. 91
Robert Bork appropriated the presumption of constitutionality
to originalism in a 1971 article 92 that some claim to be originalism’s
intellectual birth: 93 “In Lochner, Justice Peckham, defending liberty
from what he conceived as a mere meddlesome interference, asked,
‘[A]re we all . . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?’ The correct
answer, where the Constitution does not speak, must be ‘yes.’” 94
Bork also expressed this position with his (in)famous characterization
of the Ninth Amendment as a provision obscured by an “ink blot.” 95
The bottom line for him (and subsequent judicial conservatives) was
that Congress or the states may legislate freely except where the
Constitution explicitly reserves a substantive right. 96
Though Bork is perhaps the most famous expositor of the
presumption of constitutionality among judicial conservatives, other
88. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936); see also McConnell,
supra note 72, at 1289.
89. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 354–55.
90. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
91. Cf. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 228–29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
is the infamous case in which the Supreme Court struck down a New York law limiting the
number of hours bakers were permitted to work in a day on the grounds that it infringed on
the freedom to contract. Progressives and judicial minimalists attack the decision as being antidemocratic.
92. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
93. Solum, supra note 81, at 13.
94. Bork, supra note 92, at 11.
95. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 236 (quoting Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork).
96. Judge Bork used this same inkblot language for the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: “That clause has been a mystery since its adoption and
in consequence has, quite properly, remained a dead letter.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990).
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originalists continue to adopt it as part of their constitutional views.
Lino Graglia recently wrote: “[I]n a democracy the view of elected
legislators should prevail over the view of unelected judges in cases
of doubt,” 97 and “if a judge does not know that the Constitution
was understood to preclude a particular policy choice, his conclusion
must be that the choice is not constitutionally precluded.” 98 Michael
McConnell has implied that the will of the people ought to be
entitled to presumptive validity. 99 Whittington also suggests that, at
least as a descriptive matter, constitutional construction occurs
through the decisions of political actors over time, perhaps (though
not necessarily) implying that elected legislators and executives
ought to have the power to flesh out textual indeterminacies
according to their own preferences. 100 Kurt Lash’s theory of the
Ninth Amendment—which, he argues, reflects the Founders’
commitments to federalism and popular sovereignty—would lead to
a presumption that state legislative acts that restrict rights are
constitutional. 101
Graglia complains most about the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that giving the Court such
“unlimited policymaking power” through the words “due process”
and “equal protection” 102 deprives the American people “of their
most important constitutional right—the right to selfgovernment.” 103 From these arguments we see how the judicial

97. Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide
the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2011).
98. Id. at 86.
99. McConnell, supra note 72, at 1291.
100. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–9, 15–19 (1999). It is important to emphasize
that it is unclear from Whittington’s descriptive account whether he actually supports some
kind of “presumption of constitutionality” as the ideal construction.
101. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders’ View of Retained
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 969, 972 (2008) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment was meant to
give states discretion with respect to “retained rights”); Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots and
Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Case of the Ninth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 467, 472 (2008) (“The proper stance of an originalist judge in the face of
historical ambiguity, then, is one of humility. If the original meaning of the text remains
obscured, then courts lack authority to use the text to interfere with the political process. Put
another way, in a case of historical ambiguity, the very legitimacy of judicial review is
obscured—as if by an inkblot.”).
102. Graglia, supra note 97, at 76–77.
103. Id. at 85.
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minimalists differ from the libertarian-originalists: the latter want to
see more democratically enacted laws struck down as violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment and other rights provisions, whereas the
former want to see even fewer struck down. And the difference of
emphasis derives from different views of constitutional legitimacy: do
we prefer our right to self-government, or being secure in our
natural rights?
It is worth spelling out how the presumption of constitutionality
easily follows from this view of constitutional legitimacy: if the only
reason to be bound by the text is that it is clothed with the consent
of the people in a past time, then when that past consent is unclear
we should be governed by clear expressions of contemporary consent.
The underlying theory is one of popular sovereignty, where the
people govern today except where the people themselves withdrew
their power of self-government in the past. 104
To be sure, many originalists do not follow the steps I have
outlined in this section. 105 And even those who would adopt some
kind of presumption of constitutionality do so as but one part of
their constitutional interpretation, and for many subtle and complex
reasons. 106 Nevertheless, the Court still applies a robust presumption
of constitutionality when it comes to rational basis inquiries, leading
at least one scholar to write that the Court should apply such a
presumption to legislative interpretations of the Constitution as
well. 107 The theorists described above, moreover, represent a wide
104. McConnell has argued that this presumption in part reflects a commitment to
popular sovereignty. McConnell, supra note 72, at 1289–90. Nevertheless, as he demonstrates,
such a presumption has many “subtle” justifications, including not only popular sovereignty,
but also compromise and accommodation, flexibility and experimentation, institutional
differences, and judicial humility more generally. Id.
105. For example, Whittington writes that the “new originalists” of the past two decades
are “less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint,” and many “are clear
that a commitment to originalism is distinct from a commitment to judicial deference and that
originalism may often require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order to
keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.” Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608–09 (2004).
106. Recall, for example, McConnell’s statement that not only text and history, but also
longstanding practice and precedent, may restrain current majorities. See McConnell, supra
note 72 and accompanying text. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson also seems to be this kind of
minimalist. His judicial minimalism does not derive from originalism, but from a strong belief
in judicial fallibility and the necessity of judicial humility. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
SELF-GOVERNANCE 6–8 (2012).
107. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE
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range of old and new originalists. Finally, Barnett sees the
presumption of constitutionality as the nemesis of the presumption
of liberty. 108
4. Alternatives to judicial minimalism
Still, it is important not to overstate the case. There are many
originalists who genuinely wish to interpret the Constitution with a
much broader hermeneutic. Some of these originalists, such as
McGinnis and Rappaport, go so far as claiming that we no longer
need any construction—that the Constitution, when interpreted
using original interpretive conventions, will always come up with the
most probable answer. 109
There is also a middle position. As McConnell argues, though
originalism will give the answer to many constitutional questions, at
least in some cases it cannot dictate one correct answer, but rather a
range of possible meanings. It is within this range that he claims to
be a judicial minimalist. 110 John O. McGinnis shows that as an
originalist matter, the Founders were not judicial minimalists and did
not adhere to Thayer’s presumption of constitutionality. Therefore,
the proper role of judicial restraint in an original interpretive
conventions approach, which is similar to McConnell’s position, may
be described as follows:
The first obligation of a justice is to use the rich array of legal
methods and mechanisms to clarify the meaning of ambiguous or
vague text. A jurist does not simply defer to any plausible meaning
of the text, considered in isolation from the rest of the text of the
Constitution or clarifying legal methods. Only if these kinds of
analyses fail to clarify whether the legislation is based on the correct
meaning of the constitution, should the judiciary defer to the
legislature. 111

DAME L. REV. 1447 (2010).
108. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 151–52. He also claims that “no group has been more
faithful” than “modern judicial conservatives” to this presumption. Id. at 233–35.
109. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 41, at 772–73
110. Conversation with Michael W. McConnell, Professor, Stanford Law School, in
Stanford Law School (2012).
111. John O. McGinnis, Is Judicial Deference Part of the Originalist Method? 52
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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Michael Stokes Paulsen adopts a similar approach: “If the
meaning of the words of the Constitution supplies a sufficiently
determinate legal rule or standard applicable to the case at hand, that
rule or standard must prevail over a contrary rule supplied by some
other competing source of law.” 112 But if the meaning of the
language is indeterminate or under-determinate when applied to a
specific case, then typically the “political decisions made by an
imperfect representative democracy” can prevail. 113
There is a vibrant originalist literature over the past few years
that rejects judicial minimalism. These constitutional theorists have
attempted to distinguish between legitimacy and interpretation; that
is, their methods of interpretation do not obviously follow from their
commitment to popular sovereignty or to some other theory of
legitimacy. 114 Libertarian and progressive theorists, on the other
hand, adopt hermeneutics—the presumption of liberty or the
progressive presumption—that seem inextricably linked to the
theorists’ understandings of legitimacy. Many conservative judicial
minimalists, further, also adopt a hermeneutic—the presumption of
constitutionality—that appears to flow from their understanding of
legitimacy. But many originalists today offer a different approach.
D. Narrow Theories of Constitutional Legitimacy
What this Part has aimed to show is that each of these schools of
originalist constitutional interpretation—the libertarian-originalist
school, the progressive school, and the conservative judicial112. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115
YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006).
113. Id.
114. Gary Lawson identified the problem of conflating legitimacy and interpretation in a
famous law review article comparing constitutional interpretation to interpreting a fried
chicken recipe. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1825 (1997). “Modern theories of constitutional interpretation,” wrote Lawson, “typically
make the truth of propositions about constitutional meaning depend, at least to some degree,
on the extent to which those propositions [] lead to politically legitimate results.” Id. at 1823.
He added that this approach to constitutional interpretation is “completely backwards”: “The
Constitution’s legitimacy and consistency with modern practice depend on the meaning of the
Constitution; the Constitution’s meaning does not generally depend on its legitimacy or on
current practice.” Id. Lawrence B. Solum also explicitly begins with a semantic and linguistic
interpretation of the constitutional text (his “fixation” and “clause meaning” theses), and only
then asserts his “fidelity” thesis—that we have good reasons to affirm our fidelity to the
Constitution because it leads to good consequences and the “rule of law.” Solum, supra note
81.
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minimalist school—focuses on one theory of legitimacy, whether it
be securing natural rights, enabling or enhancing democratic
decision making, or popular sovereignty. Each then also claims to
adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, but each
school’s understanding of that original meaning seems to require a
hermeneutic that depends at least in part on its theory of
constitutional legitimacy.
The problem therefore becomes evident: The original meaning or
proper constitutional hermeneutic as each school understands it may
be too narrow. Indeed, it is not at all clear, for example, that the best
way to interpret the Constitution is to presume constitutionality
except where the Constitution speaks explicitly. Barnett does seem
correct that the Framers of the Ninth Amendment must have meant
something by its inclusion, and that it does, therefore, have some
original meaning to which we must adhere. 115 Further, how could the
Equal Protection Clause ever speak explicitly, unless we adopt the
original-expected-application version of originalism which many
originalists no longer espouse? 116 Barnett and Balkin are on to
something when both use the open-endedness of the abstract rights
provisions to develop their theories—even if they come to different
conclusions about what those provisions mean. The point is that the
people themselves may not have intended to be so strict with the
constitutional text: they might have written into the Constitution
more open-ended standards and principles with the expectation that
the courts and the people would interpret them differently over time.
To be sure, any of these theorists may respond that their
presumptions are simply constructions to be used when semantic
meaning cannot resolve a question. In other words, all might claim
to be “originalists,” and simply disagree on what construction to use
when the original meaning is not clear. Still, these theorists run into
the same problem insofar as they claim that their constructions
derive from the original meaning of the Constitution or the original
intent of the Framers. All of the theorists analyzed in this Article

115. BARNETT, supra note 10, at xii.
116. While many no longer espouse that version of originalism, others still do. See Fallon,
supra note 70, at 9–11 (describing the different views on “original expected applications”
originalism). Also, recall Bork’s view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Bork, supra
note 92.
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explicitly claim that their interpretive methods stem from the original
meaning of the Constitution’s various provisions.
Even if the theories did not purport to rely on original meaning
to determine the proper construction, they would still run into a
problem if their constructions derive—as this Article has argued—
from particular understandings of constitutional legitimacy that we
may not find persuasive for one reason or another. Even if these
scholars admit, in other words, that they merely prefer their
particular constructions for no other reason than because those
constructions are more consistent with their understanding of
constitutional legitimacy, we may not personally be persuaded by the
natural rights, progressive, or popular sovereignty theories of
legitimacy. It is thus unclear why we should adopt these particular
constructions rather than the constructions that the founding
generation would have used, 117 if we find the Founders’ theory of
legitimacy more persuasive.
Part II will show that if we agree that the Constitution ought to
be interpreted by the original meaning—a point on which Barnett,
Bork, and Balkin all ostensibly agree—then we ought to move away
from strictly adhering to any of the grand, yet narrow, constitutional
theories, and also the presumption of constitutionality which does a
disservice to the more open-ended provisions of the constitutional
text. More specifically, the next Part will challenge each theory’s
understanding of constitutional legitimacy by arguing that, at least as
the Founders understood constitutional legitimacy, the Constitution
would have to be legitimate in each of the three ways these theories
have advanced.
II. THE FOUNDERS ON FOUNDING
The claim in this Part is narrow: that the Founders understood
constitutional legitimacy in all three ways described in Part I. Thus,
broader constitutional hermeneutics may be necessary as an
originalist matter, if we assume that the text of the Constitution was
designed to effectuate its purposes and create a legitimate regime. If
we assume that the various hermeneutics are merely constructions
and not derived from original meaning, then we may still desire a
117. McGinnis and Rappaport argue that as an originalist matter, the founding generation
did have particular interpretive conventions that we could adopt today. Thus, construction as we
know it today would be unnecessary. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 41.
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broader hermeneutic insofar as we find the Founders’ understanding
of constitutional legitimacy more persuasive than any understanding
put forward by the schools described in this Article. Indeed, this Part
claims that if we are unpersuaded by the natural rights theory, the
progressive theory, or the popular sovereignty theory on their own
terms, then perhaps prudence can still justify adherence to the
whole. This is what James Madison seems to suggest in his
understudied response to Jefferson’s “dead hand of the past”
argument.
As stated in the introduction, understanding the Founders’ own
views on constitutional legitimacy provides at least three insights,
which will be addressed in this Part: First, the Founders’
understanding of legitimacy may offer a superior case for
constitutional obedience. Second, it will show that at least as an
originalist matter, broader hermeneutics than those currently offered
by many originalists may be necessary. It will also demonstrate that
because the Founders made compromises among the ends of
government and these grounds for legitimacy, it may be difficult to
find an appropriate originalist hermeneutic, though an original
interpretive conventions approach has promise. Finally, this Part
attempts to provide a new justification for originalism that
synthesizes these various grounds of legitimacy.
A. The Declaration of Independence
What better place to start our search than in the very document
through which our Founders declared they had a right to break from
their old loyalties? The Declaration of Independence gives us an
indication of everything the Constitution must accomplish to be
legitimate: it must derive its powers from the consent of the
governed; it must secure the just ends of government; and it must
create a representative or democratic form of government. 118 The
literature too often ignores the connection between the Declaration
and the Constitution, and many scholars have historically argued that
118. I was inspired early in my research by LARRY P. ARNN, THE FOUNDERS’ KEY: THE
DIVINE AND NATURAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DECLARATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
AND WHAT WE RISK BY LOSING IT (2012). Arnn’s book is meant for a popular audience and it
only introduces this connection between the principles of the Declaration and the
requirements of a Constitution. This Article expands on his work by bringing to bear not just
the words of the Declaration itself, but a wide range of the Founders’ writings on the subject
of founding and constitutional legitimacy.
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the Constitution of 1787 was a repudiation of the principles of
1776. 119 Nevertheless, in the Declaration, the Founders felt that they
must “declare the causes which impel them to the separation” 120
from the political bands that had previously connected them, and
thus it manifestly provides insight into general notions of political
legitimacy at the time of the Founding. Indeed, this Part will show
that the writing of the Constitution and its purposes at the time of
the Framing evoke the same principles at play in the Declaration. 121
What, in the minds of the author and signers of the Declaration,
made such a break from their previous bonds legitimate? The key
clause is well known but also often overlooked: all men are created
equal, they are endowed with unalienable rights including the right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and “[t]hat to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.” 122 In this one line
the Founders offered the two most crucial bases for constitutional
legitimacy: government must derive its power from the consent of
the governed—a social contract of sorts—and it must secure our
unalienable rights. In one fell swoop—at least if we buy the
Founders’ account—we see that perhaps both the libertarianoriginalists and the popular-sovereignty conservatives simplify their
own grounds for constitutional legitimacy. 123

119. For a summary of the progressive literature making this argument, see ALAN
GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE
ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9–11 (2006). Martin Diamond
also discusses this argument in his essay on the Federalist. See Martin Diamond, Democracy and
the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 53 (1959).
120. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
121. Madison himself invoked the Declaration of Independence in the Federalist when
justifying the authority of the Convention to propose a new constitution that would “abolish
or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 249 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
123. Ely would have a response to my claims, as he himself consulted the Declaration but
rejected this kind of comprehensive account of constitutional legitimacy. He argues that the
Declaration of Independence was like a legal brief, and “[p]eople writing briefs are likely, and
often well advised, to throw in arguments of every hue.” Specifically, “[p]eople writing briefs
for revolution are obviously unlikely to have apparent positive law on their side, and are
therefore well advised to rely on natural law.” ELY, supra note 55, at 49. Ely’s reasoning is
unpersuasive, however. First, it is very likely that in justifying a break from positive law
obligations, the Founders, as I’ve suggested, had to think long and hard about what gave them
the right to do so. It is very possible, and in fact very likely, that they believed they had to
appeal to natural rights because that was what was necessary for their act to be legitimate.

850

DO NOT DELETE

819

5/22/2015 5:59 PM

The Original Understanding of Constitutional Legitimacy

The Declaration does not stop there, however. The government,
it implies, must not only derive its powers from the consent of the
governed, but it must also continue to rule by self-government. That
is, it must constitute a democratic or republican form of
government. In the long chain of usurpations and abuses listed—
which impelled the separation—Jefferson writes that King George
III has refused to pass laws “for the accommodation of large districts
of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and
formidable to tyrants only.” 124 Further, the King “has called together
legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from
the depository of their public Records,” 125 and he has “dissolved
Representative Houses repeatedly.” 126 He has refused to cause other
legislatures to be elected, and thus the legislative powers “have
returned to the People at large for their exercise.” 127 And more
specifically, he has kept standing armies without the people’s consent
and has taxed them without their consent. 128 This train of abuses
suggests that for a government to be legitimate at all, the people
must be permitted to govern themselves in their own legislatures.
Legitimate government, then, also requires representative
government. 129

That, it seems to me, reinforces the conclusion that a constitution must protect natural rights
to be legitimate, rather than undermine it as Ely implies. Second, his criticism could be lodged
in his own justification for constitutional legitimacy. That is, if we should not take their
natural-rights claims seriously, why take their consent-of-the-governed claims seriously? They
could have easily thrown in an argument of that “hue” just to see if that would stick. Indeed, it
is interesting that Ely cites this same clause for his proposition that the Founders were
overwhelmingly concerned with consent and representative government, but then chooses to
ignore the natural rights language in this same clause. See id. at 90.
124. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776).
125. Id. at para. 6.
126. Id. at para. 7.
127. Id. at para. 8.
128. Id. at paras. 13, 19.
129. Arnn writes that we also can discover from the Declaration the importance of a
separation of powers. See ARNN, supra note 118, at 32–36. Separation of powers is certainly
necessary insofar as a government of divided powers is more likely to enable self-government
without infringing on inalienable rights.
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B. Natural Rights and Self-Government
When the Framers debated the Constitution at the Convention,
and when the people debated it in the throes of ratification, these
same themes repeated. It could not be doubted that the
Constitution had to be republican; it had to “enable” selfgovernment to be legitimate. As James Madison wrote in
Federalist 39,
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and
aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that
no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people
of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or
with that honorable determination which animates every votary of
freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of
mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention,
therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its
advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible. 130

John Adams, in his Thoughts on Government, likewise declared
that “principles and reasonings . . . will convince any candid mind
that there is no good government but what is republican.” 131 As
Gordon Wood has written, “For most Americans . . . this was the
deeply felt meaning of the Revolution: they had created a new world,
a republican world. No one doubted that the new polities would be
republics.” 132
Yet the Framers did not want total self-government. From the
first instance at the Convention, they rejected man’s capacity for
pure democracy. Two days after the Virginia Plan was proposed in
Convention, Mr. Gerry, one of the most Whiggish delegates, said,
“The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The
people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended
patriots.” 133 Mr. Mason agreed, “admitt[ing] that we had been too

130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 236.
131. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMS 83, 86 (George A. Peek, Jr., ed., 1954).
132. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, 47
(1998).
133. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand, ed.,
1966).
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democratic,” though he “was afraid we [should] incautiously run
into the opposite extreme.” 134 These are telling statements from two
delegates who would come to oppose the Constitution on the
ground that it did not adequately safeguard the rights of the people;
even the more “democratic” delegates believed the Union could not
long survive on the principle of pure democracy. Mr. Randolph, who
would also oppose the Constitution, observed that same day that the
general object of the Senate “was to provide a cure for the evils
under which the U.S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their
origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for [against]
this tendency of our Government . . . .” 135
The solution adopted by the Constitution is now famous. The
large sphere over which the federal republic could extend would
mitigate the factional spirit of smaller republics by making it more
difficult for a faction to possess the opinion of a majority of the
people. As Madison wrote in Federalist 10, representation allows for
two advantages: First, it will carve out a sphere for virtue because the
body of men to which the people delegate authority will “refine and
enlarge” the public views. 136 Second, the republic can extend over a
larger territory, and thus a single factional impulse will be less likely
to actuate the spirit of a majority. 137 But the two principles must go
together. Just as a large territory by itself does not protect the rights
of the people, neither does representation: Madison believed that the
state legislatures that then existed were actuated by a spirit of faction.
Though he praised the state legislatures when necessary for his
argument, 138 he also recognized their vices. 139 The solution, then,
must be to combine the principle of representation with the benefits
of the larger extent of territory over which that same principle allows
a republican government to rule. In this way the republican principle

134. Id. at 49.
135. Id. at 51.
136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 76.
137. Id. at 78–79.
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 341.
139. In Federalist 62 Madison is explicit on this point. He argues for the necessity of a
bicameral legislature because “all single and numerous assemblies” have a propensity “to yield
to the impulse of sudden and violent passions . . . . Examples on this subject might be cited
without number; and from proceedings within the United States . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO.
62 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 377.
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can remedy the effect of faction because the diversity of faction
would make it rare that any one attained a majority. 140
Thus republicanism over an extended territory would save selfgovernment. Yet the people’s rights still had to be protected even
from the temporary passions expressed in republican majorities. To
do so, the Framers intended to restrain republican institutions with
checks and balances, 141 federalism, 142 and separation of powers, 143 as
well as by extending the size of the republic itself. These are
overwhelmingly process-oriented protections, but the conclusion to
draw is not that therefore we should “reinforce” representation
through constitutional decisions. The protections were meant to
check republican decision making as much as republicanism itself
would be a check on faction; these protections were meant to create
a certain form of republicanism that remedied the vices of popular
government.
The Constitution also included substantive protections, especially
for property and contract rights. 144 But the natural rights theory of
140. Again, none of this is very new. Ely writes about Federalist 51’s account of faction,
see ELY, supra note 55, at 80, and Barnett emphasizes Federalist 10 to show how the Founders
were deeply troubled by the prospects of majority rule and thus tried to constrain it, see
BARNETT, supra note 10, at 33–39. For an excellent account of The Federalist along these
same lines, see Diamond, supra note 119, at 64–67.
141. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 382–83
(arguing that the Senate will protect the people “against their own temporary errors and
delusions,” and that in moments of temporary passion, “how salutary will be the interference
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens” to check such passions “until reason,
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?”). The consensus among the
Framers was that the Senate would be the most effective check on the popular passions of the
people: Mr. Dickenson argued that a Senate chosen by the state legislatures would protect the
states against encroachments from the general government, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 133, at 152–53, but also create a body of virtuous men, id.
at 150. Mason believed that the Senate would protect both the states, id. at 407, and the
wealthy, id. at 428. Madison agreed that the tendency to refine and enlarge the public views
would be amplified in the Senate, which had the “advantage of favoring a select appointment.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 375.
142. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 320
(arguing that in a federal system such as the one contemplated by the Constitution, “a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”).
143. See, e.g., id. at 319 (arguing that a separation of powers will let “ambition . . .
counteract ambition.”).
144. Barnett already provides a thorough account of the Founders’ views on natural
rights and the substantive protections they built into the Constitution to protect those natural
rights. See BARNETT, supra note 10, at 54–76. For a historical overview of Lockean scholarship
on the Founding, see GIBSON, supra note 119, at 13–21.
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Barnett and Epstein requires further discussion. While almost all
Americans agreed with the abstract concept of natural rights—and
the proposition that law contrary to natural law was void—natural
rights as such was not a starting point for discussion at the
Convention. The Constitution could not be inconsistent with
natural rights, but the substantive protections the document
afforded were most fundamentally rooted in the positive law of
constitutions, international law, and the common law. For our
purposes, the point is simply that the libertarian-originalists are right
to say that the Founders did believe the Constitution had to protect
natural rights; their flaw is that they begin with that premise in order
to arrive at the Constitution’s meaning.
In sum, from this cursory account, it appears that the libertarianoriginalist view of constitutional legitimacy is not how the Founders
understood it; it is unlikely that the Founders really would have
intended the constitutional provisions to enshrine a presumption of
liberty or classical liberalism any more than they would have
intended to create the conditions for self-rule. Similarly, the
Founders thought the Constitution had to be fundamentally
republican to be legitimate, but not purely republican, in the same
way that it could not be purely democratic. Thus the progressive
theorists who focus on “reinforcing” representation or “enabling”
self-government through current debates over constitutional
construction incorrectly de-emphasize the importance of substantive
rights protections, such as property and contract rights, that were
not meant to—but have nevertheless—eroded.
C. Popular Sovereignty
The Founders believed that the Constitution needed both to
establish a republican form of government and to protect natural
rights; but they also believed that to be legitimate, the Constitution
itself needed to be rooted firmly in the consent of the governed. As
we shall see, this notion of popular sovereignty has very different
implications than the notions of self-government, representation, or
rule by the general will of the people. Because even legislators cannot
be trusted not to abuse their power, and thus properly to discharge
the people’s will, the consent of the governed is necessary at the
moment of foundation in order to restrain the powers of the
legislators to ensure they act more consonantly with the true
interests and will of the people themselves.
855
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The Declaration of Independence was the most definitive
declaration of the right of popular, rather than some other kind of,
sovereignty. 145 James Otis declared in 1764 that “supreme absolute
power is originally and ultimately in the people; and they never did
in fact freely, nor can they rightfully make an absolute, unlimited
renunciation of this divine right.” 146 Samuel Adams declared in 1772
that “[w]hen Men enter into Society, it is by voluntary consent; and
they have a right to demand and insist upon the performance of such
conditions, and previous limitations as form an equitable original
compact.” 147 Thomas Paine adumbrated the origins of civil society in
his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense. When the defect in the moral
virtue of individuals reveals the necessity of establishing a
government, men will create a convention or assembly to deliberate
over the form of government. “In this first parliament,” Paine wrote,
“every man by natural right will have a seat.” 148
To take two last examples, Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1775
that “the origin of all civil government, justly established, must be a
voluntary compact, between the rulers and the ruled; and must be
liable to such limitations, as are necessary for the security of the
absolute rights of the latter;” for, he asks, “what original title can any
man or set of men have, to govern others, except their own
consent?” 149 Thomas Tudor Tucker, perhaps the earliest pamphleteer
to develop fully the idea of a constitution rooted in consent of the
governed as the proper mechanism for restraining the ruled, wrote in
1784: “All authority is derived from the people at large, held only
during their pleasure, and exercised only for their benefit,” and
therefore “the privileges of the legislative branches ought to be
defined by the constitution,” which must itself be “the avowed act of
the people at large.” 150 Tucker further stated, “It should be the first
145. See supra text accompanying notes 122–123.
146. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in ISAAC
KRAMNICK & THEODORE J. LOWI, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 100, 102 (2009) (1764)
(emphasis in original).
147. Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists, in KRAMNICK & LOWI, supra note 146,
at 108, 109 (1772) (emphasis in original).
148. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in KRAMNICK & LOWI, supra note 146, at 131, 132
(1776).
149. HAROLD C. SYRETT ET AL., EDS., THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1961–
79), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch3s5.html.
150. WOOD, supra note 132, at 280–81 (quoting Thomas Tudor Tucker, Conciliatory
Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice).
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and fundamental law of the State, and should prescribe the limits of
all delegated power. It should be declared to be paramount to all acts
of the Legislature, and irrepealable and unalterable by any authority
but the express consent of a majority of the citizens collected by such
regular mode as may be therein provided.” 151
In the Federalist Papers, Madison presumed the legitimacy of
this sovereignty and its necessity in forming a new government. In
Federalist 38 he argued that America “has been sensible of her
malady” and “has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from
men of her own deliberate choice.” 152 Hamilton also relied on the
ultimate legitimacy of popular sovereignty when he declared that “it
seems to have been reserved to the people of this country . . . to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitution on accident and force.” 153 Madison reminded
us finally that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power,
and it is from them that the constitutional character . . . is
derived . . . .”154
Ratification, of course, is consonant with this view of popular
sovereignty. Madison wrote that ratification appears to be both a
federal and a national act: “the Constitution is to be founded on the
assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies
elected for the special purpose,” but it is also derived from “the
assent and ratification of the several States,” whose powers are in
turn derived from “the authority of the people themselves.” Madison
ultimately concluded that ratification is more a federal than a
national act, but the Constitution will still depend on the authority
not of the state governments acting through state legislatures, but
“by that of the people themselves.” 155 In his final extended
discussion on the ratification provision, Madison argued that the
provision “speaks for itself”: “The express authority of the people
alone could give due validity to the Constitution.” 156 Hamilton

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

WOOD, supra note 132, at 281.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 231.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 121, at 27.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 310.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 239–40.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 275.
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suggested, moreover, that ratification by the people is a distinct
advantage of the Constitution over the Articles of Confederation,
which was ratified by the states. 157
Madison later added that without the ratification process the
Constitution would not be binding, even if it were just and
republican. The Constitution requires the assent of the people. The
proposed Constitution was “of no more consequence than the paper
on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of
those to whom it is addressed.” 158 The Convention bore in mind
that the “plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the
people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would
destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and
irregularities.” 159 James Wilson agreed with Madison when
responding to charges that the Convention exceeded its authority. “I
think the late Convention has done nothing beyond their powers,”
Wilson argued. 160 The Constitution “is laid before the citizens . . . to
be judged by the natural, civil and political rights of men. By their
fiat, it will become of value and authority; without it, it will never
receive the character of authenticity and power.” 161
Popular sovereignty, or at least popular ratification of
fundamental constitutions, was still a relatively new concept when
the Constitution was drafted. Between 1776 and 1778, twelve state
constitutions were enacted, ten by ordinary legislation and two by
special convention. None was submitted to popular ratification. 162
Indeed, the Framers at first attempted to offer justifications for their
authority on the basis of the sovereignty of the several states, even
though Madison 163 insisted on popular sovereignty early on. It was
not until later in their deliberations that “their focus shifted to the
legitimating effect of popular ratification and a theory of popular

157.
158.
159.
160.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 121, at 148.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 248.
Id. at 249 (emphasis in original).
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 276 (2d. ed. 2005) (quoting James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention (December 4, 1787)).
161. Id. (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 48.
163. See id. at 50 (Madison arguing that “the new Constitution should be ratified in the
most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves”).
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sovereignty.” 164 Certainly, not everyone agreed on this principle. On
the day the Convention adopted popular ratification, Gerry still
argued, “Great confusion . . . would result from a recurrence to the
people. They would never agree on any thing.” 165 Mr. Elseworth
argued that the people exist in states as a fact, and even if unanimous
consent were to be abandoned, ratification by a majority of state
legislatures would suit a new compact. 166 Gouverneur Morris
quashed such notions. If a confederation of states was to be pursued
as Elseworth seemed to desire, it would require unanimous consent
of the states pursuant to the compact already existing. “Whereas in
case of an appeal to the people of the U.S., the supreme authority,
the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them . . . .” 167
Madison then drove the point home: a true Constitution, as opposed
to a mere treaty or compact, is one founded on the people and not
on any pre-existing government body. 168 The Convention then
adopted popular ratification as the mode that would legitimize its
authority and the authority of the Constitution.
Gordon Wood, in his seminal work on the creation of the
American republic, illustrates with myriad examples from the
Founding period this new understanding of popular sovereignty
requiring an initial social compact restraining even the people’s
legislators. 169 Wood explains why this concept was so new and took
time to develop: “[S]ince the legislatures, as the legitimate
representatives, were the spokesmen for the people in the society, it
was difficult, if not impossible, without a new conception of
representation to deny them the right to alter or to construe the
constitutions as they saw fit when the needs of the society
demanded.” 170 Yet just such a new conception of representation was
necessary because of the widespread disquietude over the unjust acts
of the state legislatures in the Critical Period (1776–87). Americans
grew more and more dissatisfied with “the fairest and fullest
representative legislatures in the world.” 171
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 56.
See WOOD, supra note 132, at 268–91.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 276.
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The important point is that popular sovereignty, as the Founding
generation understood it, was not equivalent to direct rule by the
people or even representative rule by the people. It was the people’s
very representatives who were violating the rights of the people.
Thus, rule by the general will of the legislature was an inadequate
expression of the true will of the whole people. Because the people
could not rule themselves properly even through the most
representative of governments, to be truly sovereign they had to
delimit the power of the government in a contract. That was the
only way to maintain their sovereignty.
D. Prudence and the Problem of Founding
Part II.B showed that the Founders had a commitment to selfgovernment as well as to natural rights, and they likely intended to
write a constitution that would enable democratic majorities to rule
but also protect their natural rights. Thus, the Constitution, to be
legitimate, would need to make some kind of compromise between
the protection of natural rights and republican rule for legitimacy.
Part II.C showed that the Founders also believed that, through the
initial act of popular sovereignty, the people in the past would
explicitly bind the future—including republican majorities—to their
will.
But might any of these grounds for legitimacy be flawed? For
example, some argue that the initial ratification was defective because
portions of the population, such as women and slaves, were excluded
from the process. 172 The Constitution also may not have been—and
it may not be—sufficiently republican or sufficiently protective of
natural rights to satisfy some. Simply put, especially if the
Constitution or its ratification was flawed, why does one generation,
long dead and gone, have a right to bind another? Many progressives
have referred to this difficult problem as Jefferson’s “dead hand of
the past.” 173
The answer to Jefferson’s problem may be more intuitive than
one might think: founding a government is extremely difficult and

172. For a discussion of this argument, see supra note 87.
173. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 3, at 41–44 (explaining the dead hand argument, and
how his theory solves it); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 99–104 (2010);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 703, 796–97 (2002).
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the exercise should rarely be repeated. This is how James Madison
understood the challenge of founding, and it was his answer to
Jefferson. Because many scholars continue to invoke Jefferson for the
dead-hand proposition, it is only fitting that we explore the views of
the Founder who most directly responded to him. This gives us
insight into another possible ground for constitutional legitimacy,
and is worth exploring for the additional reason that his response has
been so understudied in the literature. 174
Jefferson’s formulation of the problem of a perpetual
constitution is well known. “The question Whether one generation
of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started
either on this or our side of the water,” he wrote Madison. “Yet it is
a question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but
place also, among the fundamental principles of every
government. . . . I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self
evident, ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead
have neither powers nor rights over it.” 175
Madison’s response, in which he argued that past acts of popular
sovereignty can bind the living, is less known. He wrote Jefferson in
a subsequent letter:
If the earth be the gift of nature to the living, their title can extend
to the earth in its natural state only. The improvements made by
the dead form a debt against the living, who take the benefit of
them. This debt cannot be otherwise discharged than by a
proportionate obedience to the will of the Authors of the
improvements. 176

174. Indeed, I could find only three law review articles that have quoted in the text, and
only in passing or without discussion, the relevant portions of Madison’s letter to Jefferson,
dated February 4, 1790, in which he directly responds to Jefferson’s claim that the earth
belongs to the living and that we must have constitutional conventions every nineteen years.
See Robert Blecker, If I Implore You and Order You to Set Me Free, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561,
570 (2004); Maurice H. Merrill, Constitutional Interpretation: The Obligation to Respect the
Text, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 530, 551–52 (1972); Bran C. Noonan, The Fate of New York Public
Education Is a Matter of Interpretation: A Story of Competing Methods of Constitutional
Interpretation, the Nature of Law, and a Functional Approach to the New York Education
Article, 70 ALB. L. REV. 625, 636–37 (2007). Several others articles have, however, cited to
the letter in footnotes, but none has given the text any treatment. I also could not find any
that contained an extensive discussion of Federalist 38 in this context.
175. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE
ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON 176, 176 (Jean M. Yarbrough ed., 2006) (emphasis in original).
176. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 176, 177
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Madison specifically mentioned repelling conquest, “the evils of
which descend through many generations,” as an example of
forming a debt against the living. 177 Indeed, why should men
sacrifice their lives—or their fortunes or sacred honor for that
matter—if posterity did not maintain the just fruits of such sacrifices?
The Constitution was formed on the heels of a bloody
revolution, but Madison’s claim regarding conquest extends to
constitution-making itself, as we see from his arguments in
Federalists 37 and 38. In the former, he wrote of the necessity of
“sacrific[ing] theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous
considerations.” 178 He further stated:
The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions,
assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective
interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments,
and may be classed among the most dark and degrading pictures
which display the infirmities and depravities of the human
character. 179

In short, Madison argued that founding is an extremely difficult
enterprise. It should not be too-often repeated. In surveying the
turbulent history of foundings in Federalist 38, Madison concluded:
If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement
made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and
establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on
the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to
such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily
multiplying them. 180

Prudence, for Madison, justifies ignoring the imperfections of
the Constitution. Prudence itself lends support to the proposition
that the Constitution is a legitimate document—even if it is
imperfectly legitimate with respect to other bases of legitimacy. 181

(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (emphasis in original).
177. Id.
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 226.
179. Id. at 227.
180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 229.
181. For an interesting essay interpreting the role of prudence in Madison’s political
thought in Federalist numbers 37–40, see generally Gary Rosen, James Madison and the
Problem of Founding, 58 REV. POL. 561 (1996).
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Madison’s concern for prudence can perhaps be reformulated in
terms of another notion that is required for constitutional or political
legitimacy: stability. “Stability in government,” wrote Madison in
Federalist 37, “is essential to national character and to the
advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in
the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil
society.” 182 While he was discussing the balance of energy and
stability provided by the constitutional structure of the new
government, his reasoning applies to constitutionalism itself. How
legitimate would the Constitution be were it subject to the
vicissitudes of temporary passions and opinions, if it were constantly
mutable? Indeed, this concern for stability motivated Madison to
warn in Federalist 49 against unnecessarily multiplying the
“reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole
society.” 183 We do not want the people continuously to change the
Constitution precisely because “as every appeal to the people would
carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent
appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the
requisite stability.” 184 Stability, understood as a prudential
requirement in human affairs, is another requirement for
constitutional legitimacy. 185
That is not to say that any constitution must be accepted.
Madison noted the improvements made by the American
Constitution and earlier wrote that “the convention must have
enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential
influence of party animosities—the disease most incident to
deliberative bodies and most apt to contaminate their
proceedings.” 186 The Constitution must also be, therefore, on the
whole good and just; but it need not necessarily be entirely just.
Prudence or stability may justify adherence to the whole.

182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 223.
183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 312.
184. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
185. Thomas Tudor Tucker made this same observation. Only a constitution rooted in
the collective will of the people “would have the most promising chance of stability.” WOOD,
supra note 132, at 281.
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 121, at 227.
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Jefferson’s letter notwithstanding, we might note that the
Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson himself authored, is in
fact consistent with Madison’s view of stability and prudence. The
Declaration states that when “it becomes necessary for [a] people to
dissolve the political bands which [had previously] connected
them, . . . a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that
they . . . declare the causes which impel them to the separation.” 187
The Declaration did not contemplate whimsical dissolution of the
existing social order. That order must secure the people’s rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is only when a “Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends,” that it is the
“Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government . . . .” 188 By the very reasoning and principles of the
Declaration, a people, including our generation, does not have an
unequivocal right to alter or abolish its government as long as it on
the whole secures the rights of the people to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. As long as our Constitution is on the whole just
and legitimate, prudence may demand an adherence to the political
bands that already unite us.
III. CONCLUSION, AND A CODA ON ORIGINALISM
What this Article has aimed to show is that each of the three
schools of originalism discussed here, all of which rely on a different
notion of constitutional legitimacy, has some basis in the Founders’
own understanding of legitimacy. The Founders intended the
Constitution to be republican, to protect our natural rights, and to
be obeyed simply because the people consented initially, and they
expected that the act of founding would be extremely difficult if not
impossible to repeat. In a way, we do not have to decide between
theories of constitutional legitimacy; we can decide, just as the
Founders did, that the Constitution is worthy of our obedience
because it is mostly legitimate in all three ways, and prudence thus
justifies obedience to the whole.
We can also now observe that the three strains of constitutional
interpretation are at best incomplete. The Framers did not intend to
enable democracy simply through the Constitution’s open-ended

187. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at para. 2.
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rights provisions or to constrain it simply through those provisions;
thus, both Balkin and his libertarian-originalist counterparts simplify
their claims too much. Rather, the Framers wanted to enable
democracy, but they wanted to enable it precisely by constraining its
excesses. It then becomes clear that the presumption-ofconstitutionality originalists may also simplify the political theory of
the Constitution. Put differently, perhaps no construction such as a
“presumption of liberty” or a “presumption of constitutionality” can
reliably be used in determining original meaning because the
Framers had to make compromises among the ends of government
and the three grounds of legitimacy.
That does not mean originalists should lose hope. There has
been tremendous scholarship lately on the “original interpretive
conventions” of the Founding generation. The claim of “original
interpretive conventions” originalism is that we can reliably interpret
the Constitution without resort to any modern construction such as
the presumption of liberty or constitutionality. The Founding
generation had a way of interpreting legal texts; if we simply follow
those conventions, most ambiguity in the constitutional text will
disappear. Moreover, there is no need to decide whether a
constitutional provision has any definitive meaning. We need only
decide in particular cases whether it is more likely than not that the
Constitution permits or prohibits the government action at issue. We
need only decide what is the more probable answer. 189 With these
principles in mind, constitutional interpretation from an originalist
perspective can take into account all three grounds of constitutional
legitimacy and still be a feasible enterprise.
To be sure, interpretation might still “run out.” We might find
that there is a range of plausible originalist answers to any given
question. What should a judge do then? I suspect I know what a
judge will do: a more libertarian judge will apply the presumption of
liberty; a more conservative one will apply a presumption of
constitutionality; and a more progressive one will seek to enhance
the democratic process. In one sense the choice will be arbitrary; but
in another, any of them might be justified by the Founders’ view of
legitimacy. Perhaps that is the best we can do.
Finally, we must end on a note about originalism itself as the
correct method of constitutional interpretation. After all, thus far we
189. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 83, at 243–45.
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have only shown why the Founders believed the Constitution to be
legitimate, and what that implies for the actual meaning of the
original Constitution. But originalism as a method of interpretation
does not necessarily follow from constitutional obedience. Surely
some could argue that while the Constitution ought to be obeyed,
originalism is impossible to adopt for any number of reasons.
Perhaps we simply do not have sufficient historical data available. Or
some could argue that the document itself requires non-originalist
interpretation. Whether we ought to obey the Constitution, and
whether we ought to interpret it as originalists, are still two distinct
questions.
I would like to propose that the questions are not as distinct as
most originalist scholars claim. 190 It seems intuitive to argue that if
we accept that the Constitution of 1787 is legitimate and worthy of
obedience, then we can only truly obey it if we follow its original
meaning. What is the Constitution but the meaning of its words? As
Balkin wrote, to maintain the framework of the Constitution over
time “we must preserve the meaning of the words that constitute the
framework.” 191 Or, “[t]o stick to the plan and implement it, we must
respect its particular choices about freedom and constraint for
political actors . . . .” 192 And finally: “If we do not attempt to
preserve legal meaning over time, then we will not be following the
written Constitution as our plan but instead will be following a
different plan.” 193 It seems that the very meaning of adherence to
the Constitution is that we must be originalists.
But if one is not persuaded by Balkin, then any of the other
justifications for originalism may still hold. Each of the scholars
discussed has separated the question of constitutional legitimacy from
that of why we need to be originalists. Now that we have established
what I contend is a more persuasive ground for constitutional
legitimacy, nothing stops us from adopting Barnett’s contract theory,
or Whittington’s and other scholars’ “writtenness” theories.

190. Recall that many of the recent conservative originalists, such as Lawson and Solum,
explicitly separate these questions, and that many other originalists—including the libertarians
and progressives—all claim to be separating these questions even if they seem to fail to do so in
practice.
191. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 35–36.
192. Id. at 36.
193. Id.
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If these two possibilities still do not satisfy, perhaps one could
argue that originalism is the only interpretive method that is
legitimate in all four ways discussed in this Article: If the original
Constitution struck a proper balance between natural rights and selfgovernment, then an originalist interpretation of the Constitution
would be legitimate on these two grounds. That said, perhaps the
Court’s modern glosses on the Constitution have struck a better
balance that is more legitimate. That may be. But the “originalist
Constitution” has the added advantage of having been ratified by an
initial act of popular sovereignty. Lastly, prudence demands
adherence to the originalist Constitution because modern glosses
may very well strike a worse balance between natural rights and selfgovernment, and constantly changing glosses may undermine the
requisite stability in government.
If one accepts the grounds of legitimacy accepted by the
Founders and articulated here, then the legitimacy of the
Constitution as originally understood is established. It may very well
be that a modern, non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution
meets the same (or even different) requirements for legitimacy; but
this Article does not speak to that Constitution.
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